The Dutch government has confirmed that its proposed coercive control law could apply within religious groups, raising questions about spiritual authority, religious practices and freedom of belief.
A religious community may ask its members to follow dietary restrictions, dedicate substantial time to religious activities, observe rules governing personal relationships or accept the authority of spiritual leaders. For millions of believers, these commitments are an expression of faith.
But could such practices become evidence of a criminal offence?
That question is emerging in the Netherlands, where a proposed law against psychological violence could extend the concept of “coercive control” far beyond domestic abuse and into the internal life of religious communities.
The legislation, introduced for public consultation on June 29, 2026, aims to strengthen protection against psychological abuse, particularly domestic violence and patterns of domination that can precede serious physical harm.
Justice Minister David van Weel presented the measure as part of an effort to intervene earlier, before psychological violence escalates into physical abuse or even femicide.
Yet the draft contains a significant extension that has received far less public attention.
Under the proposed Article 285aa of the Dutch Criminal Code, systematically humiliating, frightening, deceiving, restricting or otherwise influencing another person with the intention of exercising power over them could constitute a criminal offence carrying up to four years in prison.
Crucially, the provision is not restricted to intimate partners or family members.
The government’s own explanatory memorandum confirms that it could also apply within what it describes as “closed groups.”
The government confirms religious groups are included
The inclusion of religious communities is not simply a concern raised by critics of the legislation. It has been explicitly addressed by the Dutch government itself.
On June 8, 2026, Justice Minister David van Weel responded to a series of parliamentary questions submitted by MP Songül Mutluer concerning the government’s approach to abuses within groups described as “cults.”
Question 7 asked specifically whether the planned legislation criminalizing psychological violence was also intended to address abuses within these groups.
The minister confirmed that the proposed offence would not be limited to situations involving a particular relationship between the perpetrator and the victim, such as a partnership. Consequently, he explained, coercive control occurring within a closed group could also be punishable under the new legislation.
This is an important clarification. The application of the law to closed communities is expressly contemplated by the government, rather than merely inferred from the wording of the draft.
Remarkably, the same ministerial response acknowledged another difficulty.
In answers to questions 3 and 6, Van Weel explained that there is no clear, generally accepted and objective definition of a “cult.” This lack of definition also prevents the authorities from collecting reliable nationwide criminal justice statistics specifically concerning such groups.
The government is therefore contemplating the use of a new criminal offence within a category of communities that it acknowledges cannot be objectively defined by that label.
The political discussion began before the current legislation was drafted.
In September 2025, the Dutch House of Representatives adopted a motion introduced by Michiel van Nispen and Ingrid Michon-Derkzen, specifically asking the government to examine whether exclusion from religious and non-religious communities could be recognized as a punishable form of psychological violence.
The motion referred to sociaal doodverklaren, literally treating someone as socially dead, a term used to describe situations in which a person becomes excluded from their former community and social network.
The consequences of losing one’s social environment can be painful, especially when family members and close friends remain within the religious group.
But this development raises a question extending well beyond the protection of people against abuse.
Religious organizations maintain membership requirements and rules of conduct. They may withdraw membership from people who reject essential teachings or repeatedly violate community standards. Individual believers may also choose to limit relationships with people who no longer share their religious commitments.
For a government to determine when such behavior becomes criminal psychological violence, it must enter an exceptionally sensitive territory: the relationship between religious autonomy, individual conscience and freedom of association.
When religious commitment becomes suspicious
The Dutch proposal’s explanatory memorandum identifies characteristics of closed groups, including demanding loyalty, discouraging contact with outsiders and requiring substantial commitments of time or resources.
Some of these characteristics may accompany abusive situations. They may also be found in religious communities whose members voluntarily embrace a demanding spiritual life.
Monastic orders, for example, have long required vows of obedience, strict daily schedules and substantial separation from ordinary social life. Other traditions prescribe fasting, distinctive clothing or restrictions on personal conduct.
Even the decision to join a religious community against the wishes of one’s family may result in estrangement, without necessarily involving unlawful coercion.
The central problem is that religious commitment often involves accepting obligations that outsiders would not choose for themselves.
When criminal legislation introduces broad notions such as systematic influence, psychological domination and restrictions on personal freedom, the distinction between coercion and voluntary religious discipline becomes crucial.
The proposed offence requires evidence of systematic conduct and an intention to exercise power, but it would not require proof that the alleged conduct actually caused psychological injury or successfully established domination.
This places considerable weight on how investigators and courts interpret the purpose of religious practices.
A psychological concept entering unfamiliar territory
Coercive control has been extensively studied in the context of domestic violence.
In intimate relationships, it describes patterns of domination in which one partner progressively restricts another person’s freedom, isolates them from friends or relatives, monitors their activities or uses intimidation to maintain control.
This research has helped authorities recognize forms of abuse that may occur without physical violence.
Its extension to religious organizations, however, lacks a comparable scientific consensus.
Religious commitment involves complex questions of belief, identity, personal choice and social belonging. Applying psychological models developed for intimate-partner violence to an entire community presents difficulties that have troubled scholars and courts for decades.
Similar issues emerged during earlier controversies surrounding theories of religious “brainwashing.”
In 1987, the American Psychological Association declined to endorse a report associated with psychologist Margaret Singer concerning deceptive and indirect techniques of persuasion and control.
In the 1990 case United States v. Fishman, a federal court excluded proposed expert testimony involving theories of religious brainwashing.
Another warning came from Italy. In 1981, the Italian Constitutional Court struck down the criminal offence of plagio, which concerned placing another person under psychological subjugation. The Court found that the offence was too indefinite and lacked objectively verifiable criteria for determining criminal responsibility.
These decisions arose in different legal contexts, but they illustrate a recurring problem: laws concerning psychological domination must identify conduct that can be established through reliable evidence rather than subjective judgments about another person’s influence.
This concern is shared, at least in relation to the precision of the proposed offence, by Dutch legal professionals themselves.
The Netherlands Bar Association has supported the objective of combating psychological violence while warning that the proposed definitions lack sufficient precision.
The Dutch Council for the Judiciary has also requested clarification of the boundaries of the proposed offences.
For religious minorities, such uncertainty could have particularly serious consequences. Practices that appear familiar within established religious traditions may be viewed very differently when they belong to smaller or less understood communities.
European judges have already addressed religious commitment
The European Court of Human Rights has repeatedly examined conflicts between religious commitments and the expectations of family members or wider society.
One particularly relevant judgment is Jehovah’s Witnesses of Moscow and Others v. Russia, delivered in 2010.
Russian authorities had accused the religious community of damaging families, partly because some members devoted considerable time to religious activities and developed disagreements with relatives who did not share their beliefs.
The Court rejected the assumption that such estrangement necessarily constituted coercion.
In paragraph 111, it recognized that religious observance may demand considerable personal dedication, sometimes reaching the intensity of monastic life. Where such commitments result from an individual’s independent and free choice, resulting family tensions cannot automatically be attributed to coercive activity by the religion.
This distinction matters directly to the Dutch debate.
The Court has also recognized that the autonomy of religious communities forms an essential part of democratic pluralism.
In Fernández Martínez v. Spain, decided by the Grand Chamber in 2014, it affirmed that the state must respect the ability of religious communities to organize themselves according to their beliefs, including decisions concerning membership.
The principles established by these judgments reflect the protections guaranteed by Article 9 of the European Convention on Human Rights, together with freedom of association under Article 11.
Yet the explanatory memorandum accompanying the Dutch proposal does not provide a specific examination of its implications under Article 9.
For legislation that expressly contemplates intervention within communities organized around strong convictions, that omission deserves attention.
A narrower law would protect both victims and freedom of belief
The Netherlands has a long history of religious tolerance and the protection of freedom of conscience. Its modern legal framework recognizes that religious freedom encompasses both individual belief and the collective practice of religion.
The current legislative debate raises a fundamental question about how that freedom should operate when the government seeks to protect people from psychological abuse.
A practical solution would be to restrict the proposed standalone offence of coercive control to intimate-partner and close-family relationships, where the concept has a more established scientific and legal foundation.
Violence, threats, fraud, unlawful confinement and other criminal conduct would remain punishable throughout society, including within religious organizations.
Such an approach would focus the new legislation on the situations for which the concept of coercive control was primarily developed, while preserving the distinction between unlawful domination and freely accepted religious discipline.
That distinction matters to every religious community, whether large or small, traditional or recently established.
A society committed to religious freedom must leave room for beliefs and ways of life that others may consider demanding, unfamiliar or difficult to understand.
When the state begins determining how much spiritual influence is acceptable, it risks replacing the individual’s freedom to choose a religious commitment with a government-approved understanding of what religious life should look like.
As the Netherlands prepares the next stage of its legislation, that is the boundary its lawmakers will need to confront.
As of November 19, 2026, the proposal remains in the legislative preparation stage and has not been adopted.

